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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or
statutes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant incorporates herein his statements of facts set
forth in his initial Brief,

(Appellant's Brief pp. 3-9).
ARGUMENT
I

CALAME'S RESEARCH OF THE REAL McCOY WAS NOT
A "BUSINESS PURSUIT" AS DEFINED IN USAA'S POLICIES
AND COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE REAL McCOY
IS NOT EXCLUDED
In point I of its argument USAA cites Fire Ins. Exchange
vs. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that "the
primary purpose of a homeowner's policy

is to provide package

coverage for exposures incidental to home ownership. . . "

(USAA's

Brief p. 8 ) . Because Calame's involvement with The Real McCoy was
not incidental to home ownership, USAA argues, USAA need not defend
or indemnify Calame in the McCoy lawsuit.
and cannot stand

However, Alsop does not

for the proposition USAA claims it does and

reliance on Alsop is an attempt to divert this courts attention
from the policy language at issue in this case and established law
regarding insurance contract interpretation.
USAA cannot seriously argue that policies of the type it
sold to Calame do not cover liability arising out of activities
unrelated to home ownership.
policy

or

the

umbrella

No where in either USAA's homeowners

policy

issued
1

to

Calame

is

personal

liability coverage limited to acts incidental to home ownership.
USAA's personal umbrella policy purchased by Calame defines injury
within its coverage to include the very claims asserted against
Calame in the underlying McCoy lawsuit.

The policy reads in

relevant part:
We will pay for injury or damage for which an
insured becomes
legally
liable.
This
liability must arise from an occurrence which
takes place during the policy period.
* * * *

We will also insure against
liability
occurrences that are not covered by primary
insurance. . . .
* * * *

(5)

'Injury7 means the following:
(a)

Bodily injury.

(b) Mental injury.
(c) Wrongful eviction or detention.
(d) Liable.
(e) Slander.
(f)

Defamation of character.

(g)

Invasion of privacy.

(h)

False arrest or imprisonment.

(i)
Malicious
humiliation.

prosecution

or

(j)
Assault and battery if
committed by an insured or at his
direction to protect persons or
property and if the conduct is not
criminal.
(Addendum B, pp. 1 of 6, or p. 6 or pp. 2 of 6, or pp. 7 and 8
(underlined portions of above quote is appellants emphasis)).
2

It is clear that coverage provided by USAA's policies
purchased by Calame is not limited to liability incidental to home
ownership, whatever this term means.

Such a conclusion would be

counter to the language in the contracts themselves.

The holding

in Alsop cannot be distorted by USAA to change the contractual
language in its policies.

Whether coverage under USAA's policies

is excluded depends upon the exclusionary language in the insurance
contracts not whether the activity giving rise to the liability is
"incidental to home ownership."
USAA's policies exclude coverage for liability arising
out of a business engaged in by its insured.

The homeowner's

policy defines business as a "trade, profession or occupation."
(Addendum A ) .
excludes

The business exclusion in USAA's Umbrella policy

liability

arising

occupation of an insured."

from

"the

(Addendum B ) .

business

profession

or

USAA is not entitled to

an interpretation of the business which is broader than what the
policy itself provides since exclusion provisions in insurance
policies are strictly constructed against the insured.

Home Sav.

& Loan v. Aetna Cas. Sur., 817 P.2d 341, 348 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Neither policy excludes from coverage every endeavor of an insured
which might generate money or an endeavor which might be the
regular trade, professional or occupation of someone other than the
insured although it is not the insured's.
As argued in Calame's initial Brief, Calame's trade,
profession or occupation is not that of a book researcher and his
involvement with The Real McCoy was unrelated to his professional
3

private

investigation

exclusions

business.

Thus,

in USAA's policies purchased

the business

pursuit

by Calame cannot be

construed to exclude coverage for liability arising out of Calame's
involvement with The Real McCoy simply because Calame might

alize

some financial gain from his involvement or because book research
is the regular trade, profession or occupation of others.

The

cases cited by Calame in his initial brief support this conclusion.
The cases cited by USAA in point I of its argument do not
support USAA's claim that Calame was engaged in a business pursuit
as defined in its policies.

In Alsop an insured who was a

chiropractor by profession sought coverage under his homeowner's
policy for damage claims arising out of his chiropractic treatment
of a woman.

The insured conceded that his treatment of the woman

constituted

"professional

services"

and

"business

pursuits".

Instead, the insured sought coverage under the theory that although
the negligence and malpractice claims were excluded from coverage,
the fraud, breach of warranty and unlicensed practice of medicine
claims asserted against him were not a part of the business or
professional services rendered.
P.2d

389, 390 (Utah 1985).

Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop, 709

The court rejected this argument

stating that all of the claims against the insured chiropractor
arose out of his professional capacity as a chiropractor.

Id. In

Calame's case, he does not concede his work as the researcher of
The Real McCoy constituted his profession or business. Nor, is the
issue which the court in Alsop resolved present in the instant
case, i.e., whether an insured can avoid the business exclusion by
4

arguing that some claims arising out of the same activity are
covered and others are not. Calame has no quarrel with the court's
reasoning and conclusions in Alsop. However, the case is factually
irrelevant to his.
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 549 S.2d 1200 (D.C.A.
Fla. 1989), cited by USAA, an insured doctor pulled on a fellow
physician's stethoscope while it was draped around her neck during
a confrontation regarding the care and treatment of a mutual
patient.

The court concluded that the physician's homeowner's

policy did not provide coverage because the injury arose out of a
business pursuit.

The distinguishing aspect of Liberty Mutual is

that the insured's profession is that of physician and the injuries
arose out of activities directly related to that profession.

As

discussed throughout his initial Brief and this Brief, this is not
the case with Calame.
Similarly, in USAA v. Schneider, 620 F. Supp. 246 (D. C.
N.Y. 1985), John McEnroe was sued by a spectator with whom McEnroe
had an altercation at one of McEnroe's matches.

The court

concluded that the altercation arose out of McEnroe's business
pursuit and coverage for the claim was excluded under McEnroe's
homeowner's policy.

Again, in Schneider the insured was engaging

in his profession when the claim against the insured arose. Calame
was

not

engaging

in his

profession

or occupation

with

his

involvement with The Real McCoy.
The cases cited by USAA do not control the issue before
this court since the cases are clearly distinguishable.
5

Nor, do

the cases change the scope of coverage provided under the policies
as defined by the policies.

Rather, the court must decide this

case according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the policies
language. The business pursuit exclusions in USAA's policies sold
to Calame do not exclude coverage for claims against Calame arising
out of his involvement with The Real McCoy.

Calame's involvement

with The Real McCoy was not part of his private investigation
business.

Calame was not asked to assist Rhodes with the book

because Calame was a private investigator; nor, did Rhodes hire
Calame as a private investigator. Calame was sought out because of
his substantial knowledge of the two skyjacking cases written about
in The Real McCoy and agreed to participate in the project because
of his own interest in the book's thesis.

Calame's involvement

with The Real McCoy was his first and only experience with book
researching.

Judge Noel erred in concluding Calame's involvement

with The Real McCoy constituted a business pursuit as defined in
the insurance policies USAA sold to Calame.
II
CALAHE'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE REAL McCOY WAS
NOT ACTIVITY "INCIDENTAL" TO CALAME#S "TRADE,
PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION"
In Point II of its argument, USAA argues that although
Calame may claim that his "trade, profession or occupation11 is not
that

of

a book

researcher, his work

on The Real

McCoy

is

nevertheless "incidental" to his profession as an FBI agent and
private investigator and accordingly Calame was engaged in a
business pursuit excluded under its policies.
6

However, USAA's

argument is incorrect for two reasons.

First, the facts clearly

establish that Calame's involvement with The Real McCoy was not
"incidental" to his trade, profession or occupation. Second, USAA
misapplies the rule of law upon which it relies in that the case
law clearly establishes that one can perform activities outside
one's employment similar to activities during employment which will
not be found "incidental" to one's employment.
The fact that Calame was involved with The Real McCoy
because of knowledge acquired while an FBI agent does not render
his involvement "incidental" to his profession as an FBI agent.
Calame became involved with The Real McCoy in 1983. Calame has not
worked as an FBI agent since 1972. Nor, was Calame acting in any
official or quasi official capacity when he researched The Real
McCoy. The facts also establish that Calame's involvement with The
Real McCoy was not incidental to his profession as a private
investigator.

Calame was not asked by Rhodes to become involved

with the book because Calame was a private investigator; nor was
Calame hired to do private investigatory work.
The cases cited by USAA in support of the proposition
that

activities

business

pursuit

incidental
involved

to

one's

situations

employment
where

at

constitute a
the

time the

activities giving rise to the claim against the insured, the
insured was acting in his professional capacity or working in his
occupation. The cases do not stand for the proposition that tasks
performed

in

an

endeavor

unrelated

to

one's

regular trade,

profession or occupation yet possibly similar to some tasks which
7

would be performed in one's regular trade, profession or occupation
are incidental to an insured's business pursuit.
In American Family Family Mut. Ins, Co. v. Nickerson, 813
F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1987), cited by USAA, the court held that an off
duty policy officer's shooting of a motorist after flashing his
badge and identifying himself as a police officer were activities
incidental to the officer's regular employment where the police
manual imposes upon officers the obligation to respond to suspected
criminal

activity

even while off duty.

Id. at

136-137.

In

Nickerson the insured's conduct was directly related to, and in
fact, mandated by his regular employment.

In Calame's case, Calame

was not working as a private investigator or an FBI agent during
his involvement with The Real McCoy.

Nickerson is not relevant to

this case.
USAA also cites Desormeaux v. Romero, 560 S.2d 658 (La.
Ct. App. 1990).

In Romero the court concluded that the business

pursuit exclusion in a homeowner's policy precluded coverage for a
claim

against

a

private

investigator's

alleged

defamatory

statements made while employed as a private investigator and made
in connection with the objectives of the investigation.
660.

Id. at

As with Nickerson, Romero is inapplicable to Calame's case

because Calame was not employed as a private investigator by Rhodes
at

anytime.

Calame's

essentially a hobby.

involvement

with

The

Real

McCoy

was

Calame was interested in the book's thesis

and gained knowledge of the book'

subject matter over ten years

before his involvement with the project.
8

Contrary to USAA's argument, several insurance coverage
cases construing business pursuit exclusions establish that one can
perform activities outside one's regular employment similar to
activities performed during his employment and these activities
will not be found incidental to his employment for purposes of the
business pursuit exclusion•

In Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v.

Duncan, 206 SE.2d 672 (Ga. 1974) an automobile mechanic engaged in
part-time racing activities.

The mechanic occasionally won prize

money and sometimes hired other drivers to race his vehicles for
him.

The court held that the mechanic was not engaged in a

"business pursuit" within the policy's exclusion.
In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Vulmarkovic, 562 NE.2d
1073 (1990) the court held that an insured limousine driver was not
engaged in a business pursuit when he struck a pedestrian after he
had dropped of his last fare even though the limousine driver was
on call 24 hours a day.

The insurer argued that the insured had

merely stopped for dinner as a minor interruption of his business
pursuit of returning the car to his garage. The court stated that
this argument would only be possible if the accident had occurred
while the insured was driving from one job to another, from a lunch
break to another job, or was on his way home directly after
dropping off his fare.

The court stated that the fact that the

limousine driver was on call 24 hours a day did not mean that
whenever he was driving a limousine he was engaged in a business
pursuit.

9

In USAA v, Pennington, 810 SW.2d 777 (Tex. Ct. App. - San
Antonio 1991).

The insured ran a quarter horse breeding business

with his father. Apart from the breeding business with his father,
the insured purchased a quarter horse in order to experiment with
new training systems to condition horses for racing competition.
The insured placed an advertisement in a local newspaper to hire
someone

to

ride

the

horse.

Penny

Pennington

answered

the

advertisement and during her interview Pennington was asked to
demonstrate her riding abilities by riding the horse.

The horse

reared while Pennington was mounted on her and Pennington sustained
injuries. USAA denied coverage for Pennington's claim against its
insured, invoking the business pursuit exclusion.

A jury found

that the insured's enterprise with the horse was not a business
pursuit, thus establishing USAA's responsibility to defend its
insured.

USAA appealed claiming the evidence was factually and

legally insufficient to support the jury's finding and that the
evidence established as a matcer of law that the ownership of the
horse was

a business

pursuit.

The Texas Court of Appeals

disagreed, holding that the evidence did not establish as a matter
of law that the ownership of the quarter horse was a business
pursuit and that the evidence was both legally and factually
sufficient to support the jury's finding that it was not.

Id. at

782.
USAA in this case incorrectly implies case law finding
certain activities incidental to an insured's employment.

The

facts set forth in Calame's initial brief establish that Calame's
10

involvement with The Real McCoy was not incidental to his regular
profession as a private investigator.

Calame's involvement with

The Real McCoy was not incidental to his former employment as an
FBI agent.

Calame,s involvement with The Real McCoy began nearly

10 years after Calame terminated his employment as an FBI agent.
USAA also relies upon three California cases for the
proposition that "an activity not connected with the primary
occupation of the insured, or which may occur on a one time basis,
is nevertheless properly excluded as an excluded business pursuit."
(USAA's Brief p. 14).
beyond

the

specific

However, these California cases go well
language

in

the

policies

exclusionary

provisions and employee an expansive interpretation of the business
pursuit exclusion. Such an expansive construction of exclusionary
language is contrary to well-settled rules of insurance contract
construction adopted by this court and the Utah Supreme Court.
Insurance policy interpretation begins with examination
of the insurance contract itself.

LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life

Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah, 1988).

When the provisions in

the policy being interpreted are exclusionary provisions, they
should be strictly construed against the insurer, id. at 859; Home
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. Sur.f 817 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Most importantly, the court's interpretation of the insurance
policy should be guided by the rule that an insured is entitled to
the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be
provided. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P. 2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
1985).
11

USAA's homeowner7s policy excludes liability arising v. .t
of "business pursuits."
defined in the policy:
occupation."

This otherwise general and vague term is
"'Business7 includes trade, profession or

(Addendum p. 2 of 18 or p. 5).

USAA's personal

umbrella policy excludes liability arising from "the business
profession or occupation of an insured."
10).

(Addendum B p. 506 or p.

Neither policy defines business to include every activity

which might result in money to an insured whether or not the
activity is part-time or whether or not the activity is the regular
trade profession or occupation of the insured.

USAA could have

easily so defined the business pursuits in its policies. They did
not,

Since the activities associated with Calame's involvement

with The Real McCoy are not clearly excluded from coverage, it is
presumed that such activities are covered under the policies. LPS
Hospital v. Capitol Life Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988) (citing
Phil Schroeder, Inc v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 659 P.2d 509, 511
(Wash. 1983) .
Employing the reasoning of the California cases cited by
USAA contradicts established rules of insurance law construction;
whereas the numerous cases cited by Calame interpret business
pursuits exclusions in a manner consistent with these rules.

To

deny Calame coverage for the lawsuit arising out of his involvement
with The Real McCoy by employing USAA's broad and expansive
interpretation of the business pursuit exclusion would wrongly deny
Calame the broadest protection he could have reasonably unde^ tood
to be provided by the policy.

Calame purchased two policies from
12
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insurance provision should be resolved in favor of the insured.
The

court

had

concluded

that

the

provision

was

unambiguous.

Second, and most importantly, the Black case is out of Idaho and
cannot change Utah

law on this point which

is that

ambiguous

provisions in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer
without resort to extrinsic evidence:
'Exclusion clauses are strictly construed
against the insurer, especially if they are of
uncertain import. An insurer may, of course,
cut off liability under its policy with a
clear language, but it cannot do so with that
dulled by ambiguity. As with the provisions
of the policy as a whole, so also with the
exceptions to the liability of the insured,
the language must be construed so as to give
the insurer the protection which he reasonably
had a right to expect; and to that end any
doubts, ambiguities and uncertainties arising
out of the language used in the policy must be
resolved in his favor.
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P. 2d at 859 (quoting
Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 659 P.2d at 511; see
also Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons, 665
P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983); Williams v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co.. 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979); Metro. Prop. & Sign Liability
v. Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Accordingly,

if this court concludes that the business pursuit exclusions are
ambiguous this court is bound to construe the policies against USAA
to avoid a denial of coverage.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Calame respectfully
requests that this court reverse the trial court's order granting
USAA's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Calame's Motion for

S" immai ^ J i idgment
consideration

and remai id

t h e erase

!:: ::

I::l le tri a]

coi ir t

of Cciidme's remain, nu . , ; - i i n s

DATED t h i i

." •••- d a y o f December, i T ^ i

BARMAN E . K I P F
KIRK G. G I B B S

Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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